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- and (a) too certa:l.~ many was not designed with security in mind. switchboards with too many operators who There are can overhear conversations, (b) too many tei'minal boards where cables frail sensitive telephones intermix w1th service going
- : State - l; Secret Service - 3; CIA - l; Army - 3; and Air Force - 2 . To handle the complex telephone situation, we have, since my memorandum of last week, added three men from the military . This past week was devoted primarily to organization
- ~ / OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C; .3.2 Cc ;L __....- 20301 , /1AR2s 1965 MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. J. William Doolittle First Assistant, Civil Division Department of Justice Pursuant to our telephone conversation of March 24, 1965, we
- indications that the USSR might be interested in joining INTELSAT under somewhat changed circumstances. I attach for your in formation a Paris airgram, A-2053, in which Bohlen reports an interesting conversation in this connection. I also attach the recent
- a telephone inquiry to the internal security division of the Justice Department, but was unable to locate anyone who had seen the SAC message as yet. I did learn that around October 4, 1966, the Defense Department is supposed to have written to State
- such as secure telephone systems, content control code~ and the item register may enhance the information handling process. Requirements should originate from intelligence producers and users. Inasmuch as the members of the community are users as well
- for service between North America and Europe. This satellite has a capa~ity of 240 tele phone channels which are used to provide normal telecommunica tion services including telephone, telegraph and the exchange of TV programs. INTELSAT II. Two satellites
- about the Academy and the essence of what was said immediately follows: Perkins said he had had several telephone calls from Senator Symington who is "frothing" at the White House, Secretary Rusk, et al, for letting him down by not standing firmly behind
- in conversion of raw materials into end items. In effect, therefore, current stockpile objectives would provide production support for up to a four-year war. 2. Accessibility of foreign sources of supply.--Department of Defense judgment on the accessibility
- requested. Signature ------------------------Home Telephone No. Husband's Office Address -------- Signed --------------------------.Authorizing Officer Agency "--------------------------- Office Telephone No. Date · *This 'a pplication, if submitted
Folder, "NSAM # 345: Nuclear Planning, 4/22/1966," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 8
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- This is further to our telephone conversation earlier this week and provides comments requested by you. I have expressed some concern that the many questions raised in the subject memorandum might prompt the con clusion that a workable solution to implementation
Folder, "NSAM # 345: Nuclear Planning, 4/22/1966," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 8
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- USE ONLY II-B-1 PROGRAM SUPPORT CONSTRUCT10N 1. Technical assistance to Kusaie ($35,000) Assist in road rehabilitation Install 50 KW · ·g enerator and freezer for fish c. Install small telephone with switchboard at radio shack to connect
- may arise. It is also concluded that the u.s. experience in attempting to effect a conversion of the three SAC bases to civilian uses through extensive approaches to the GOM indicate that in future withdrawals from military bases u.s. attempts
- with the President in the wider policy context which governed the President's conversations with Prime Minister Wilson. Jn~~~ McGeorge Bundy · DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4 NLJ .By 'l.3- t z . 'Kf ,NAltA, Date // - If-? ;i_ 3 --- THE WHITE HOUSE
- Chiari' s visit, obtain agreement of the Governments of Panama and Colombia for on-site surveys of potential sea-level canal routes in their respective countries. .l (4) Based on the Panamanian reactions to the outcome of our conversations, develop
- ~ d-fZX. d ~ LIMITED DISTRIBUTION 8122 May 17, 1966 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALT W. ROSTOW THE WHITE HOUSE SUBJECT: NSAM 337 1. Pursuant to your recent conversation with Mr. Handley, the Department of State has reviewed with representatives
- Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs . 5/) ~ ~ ~~ O:YV}IS c., &,o March 5, 1964 (i 1 Mr. Bromley K. Smith, The White House Per our conversation of yesterday. The attached has been considered but not yet ----- approved by the WLG. Chairman
- to produce nuclear weapons. To date, no Israeli facilities have a nuclear weapons making capability, . but equipment conversions could make this possible within two years or so. Therefore, Israel appears to have the option. of joining the small circle
- to get by this impasse., From my conversation with Charlie Murphy it is clearly useless to talk to anyone but Secretary Freeman., I am therefore bucking the problem to you - - on the assumption that perhaps you can talk directly with S8cretary Freeman 0r
- recent conversation with Mr. Handley, the Department of State has reviewed with representatives of Defense and CIA the October 22, 1965 memorandum for t he President from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Centra l
- to test the Soviets 1 intentions by further conversation. If, however, the next round of conversation is fruitless, NASA should be requested to develop some specific action proposal that would represent a new initiative on our part. At the last meeting
- of U.S. security interests and, conversely, on assessing the ability of the U.S. to bring its own capabilities to bear effectively. Analytical means will be employed to the extent feasible. C. MAIN LINES OF INQUIRY 1. The Over-all Power Balance
- , be desirable to make more .systematic our I conversations SECRET SECRE'L 6 conversations about the issue with governments other than the British. These could be carried on in Washington, various capitals and New York in conjunction with talks about
- . t ) G/PM July 21, 1964 MBMOMNDlJM OF CONVERSATION SUBJBt NSAM 311 ~) Partic:.ipantr--·State: Amba$SQdor Thompson Defense1 Seymour · eise CIA: Mr . Cline Mr •. Rowen General Vogt Mr. Frle.dtnan 1. Ambassador Thompson indicated he thought
- then this paper has been the point of departure for discussions with the GVN. So far the GVN has only accepted and implemented the gradual conversion of Mobile Action Cadre to survey cadre. GVN ministries have continued to use cadre proliferation as a substitute
Folder, "NSAM # 282: Project Sulky, 2/11/1964," National Security Action Memorandums, NSF, Box 3
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- , Tsarapkin stated that the number of peaceful-uses detonations would · have to be strictly limited and equal as between the US and UK on one side and the USSR on the other. On September 18, 1959 Khrushchev, in conversation with Ambassador Lodge, expressed his
- it on a telegraphic basis. There have already been technical conversations with the Soviets on this subject, and we should give this matter promif, attention. 8. Aleutians-Kuriles Seismic Experiments. The Soviets turned down our offer for joint Aleutians-Kuriles
- of Deptel 1045 authorized you to take this step with Ayub in your conversation: · .~I i ..,1 i'..'' ~ i . ... i ( ,1 .. .; on Feb. 13 and we see from Embtel 1530 that you .have done so. · ~Qur thoughts , l I ' t